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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether and to what extent nonreciprocal preference regimes 
have increased developing countries’ exports to richer countries. Moreover, it analyzes 
how they  have  affected  donors’ exports to beneficiary countries. Using recent 
developments in the econometric analysis of the gravity equation over the period 1990-
2008, we find robust evidence that, on the whole, nonreciprocal preference regimes and 
GSP schemes have had an economically significant effect on exports from developing 
countries. However, the estimation of catch-all dummies masks heterogeneous results 
for the individual schemes. Finally, we  find that nonreciprocal  regimes  have  also 
increased exports from donors to beneficiary countries. 
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The increase of exports from developing countries to industrialized nations’ 
markets has long been considered an essential element to reduce poverty, promote 
sustainable development and reap the potential benefits of globalization  for the 
developing world. While there has been an intense debate in policy-making circles on 
how best to accomplish these aims, the prevailing approach has implied that developed 
countries  give support to the integration of developing countries into the world 
economy through an “special and differential treatment” (in the form of nonreciprocal 
preferences) for imports from the developing world. The leading instrument for such 
trade preferences has been the Generalized System of Preferences, but there exist other 
unilateral (nonreciprocal) preference regimes that are part of this approach.  
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is an exception to the GATT 
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination emerged in second half of the 1960s, 
through which developed countries provide preferential access to their markets to a 
large number of developing countries and territories. Australia was the first developed 
country authorized to establish  a GSP for developing countries, and since the early 
1970s other developed countries followed in Australia footsteps (EU’s countries, US, 
Canada or New Zealand, among others).  
In addition to the standard GSP schemes, the EU and the US have signed other 
preference regimes with poor countries. On the one hand, the Cotonou Agreement (also 
known as ACP-EU Partnership Agreement) is the most comprehensive partnership 
agreement between developing countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP) and the European Union (EU). The basic principle of Cotonou Agreement 
(henceforth ACP-EU) is that, with some exceptions, the ACP countries’ industrial 
exports have duty- and quota- free access to the EU market. Another preference regime,  
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that forms part of the EU’s GSP scheme, is the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
arrangement, which provide unilateral trade preferences to the EU market for products 
from the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs). On the other hand, besides the United 
States’ GSP program (that started in 1976), the US administration also grants other, 
more recent, nonreciprocal preference regimes including the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI), the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA). 
This paper investigates whether and to what extent unilateral preference regimes 
(UPRs) have increased developing countries’ exports. Moreover, it also analyzes how 
they have affected donors’ own export performance to the corresponding beneficiary 
countries.  GSP and other unilateral regimes are nonreciprocal programs. However, 
developed countries take into account their own commercial interests in the design of 
the  criteria for eligible countries. For instance, in the case of the US scheme of 
preferences such criteria include ensuring “equitable and reasonable” access in the 
beneficiaries’ market to US products, protecting intellectual property rights, and 
preventing the seizure of property belonging to US citizens or businesses. In fact, 
following with the same example, the statutory goals of the US GSP include not only 
the development of developing countries by trade (rather than aid) as a more efficient 
way of promoting economic growth and development, but also the promotion of US 
exports in developing countries markets and trade liberalization in developing countries 
(Jones, 2006). 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that neither  measure and 
compare the effect on the developing countries exports of all nonreciprocal preference 
regimes  nor investigate the potential impact in the reverse direction. This  paper fits 





To preview our results, we find robust evidence that, on the whole, 
nonreciprocal preference regimes and, in particular,  GSP schemes have had an 
economically significant effect on exports. The ACP-EU, EBA as well as GSP schemes 
of EU, US, Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey show a positive effect on 
developing countries exports to the corresponding developed markets. However, we do 
not find evidence that membership in AGOA has had a positive effect on exports from 
African countries to the US. The same occurs for membership in the GSP schemes of 
Australia, New Zealand or Russia. Finally,  we find that nonreciprocal preference 
regimes  have  also boosted  exports from the donors (developed countries) to the 
beneficiaries (developing countries). 
 In particular, we estimate the effect of UPRs on exports with 
several estimation techniques including a recently developed econometric approach: the 
two-stage estimation procedure proposed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). 
This technique allows to correct for selection bias and to account for exporter 
heterogeneity. The sample covers 177 countries over the period 1990-2008.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background of the GSP 
schemes and other nonreciprocal preference regimes. Section 3 presents the 
methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. 
Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
                                                   
1 The main branch of that literature examines the effect of trade agreements (see, for example, Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007; Baier, Bergstrand and Vidal, 2007; Carrère, 2006; Gil, Llorca and Martínez-Serrano, 
2008a or Lee Park and Shin, 2008). But the gravity model has also been regularly used to estimate the 
trade effects of currency unions (Rose, 2000; Glick and Rose, 2002; Micco, Stein and Ordoñez, 2003), 
exchange rate regimes (Klein  and Shambaugh, 2006 or Gil,  Llorca and Martínez-Serrano, 2007) 
GATT/WTO membership (Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007 or Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 
2007), and even of the physical presence of government officials in the destination markets or the 
existence of state visits (Rose, 2007; Nitsch, 2007; Gil, Llorca and Martínez-Serrano, 2008b or Volpe-




2. Background: Nonreciprocal preference regimes  
Since the early 1970s the EU, the US and other developed countries have 
provided developing countries with preferential market access via trade policies in the 
form of unilateral trade preference’ programs, nonreciprocal agreements or preferential 
trade agreements. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was the first one-way 
preferential regime implemented by developed countries in order to promote developing 
countries exports. The GSP is a system of individual national schemes based on 
common goals and principles. However, due to the existence of important differences in 
developed countries’ economic structures and tariff programs there is not a unified 
system of tariff concessions. Each preference-granting country  establishes particular 
criteria and conditions for defining and identifying developing countries beneficiaries.  
The basic principle behind the GSP schemes is to provide a wide range of goods 
originating in developing countries with preferential market access (usually in the form 
of lower tariff rates or duty-free status) to developed country markets in order to spur on 
economic growth. The GSP were established on the basis that preferential tariff rates in 
developed country markets could promote export-driven industry growth in developing 
countries. The argument was that only the market size of industrialized trading partners 
were large enough to provide enough economic motivation to attain these goals. But the 
GSP were also established, in part, because lesser-developed countries called during the 
early negotiations on the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for “special 
and differential treatment”. 
Since they were nonreciprocal and discriminatory preference programs, the GSP 
posed some problems under the GATT norms. They were inconsistent with the principle 
of reciprocity and, most importantly,  with the principle  placed on GATT Parties in  
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GATT Article I:1 to grant most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff treatment to the products 
of all other GATT Parties. In 1965, GATT Parties made an amendment recognizing the 
special economic needs of developing countries and allowing for non-reciprocity. With 
respect to the issue of MFN, in 1971, GATT Parties adopted a waiver of Article I for 
GSP programs, which allowed developed contracting parties to accord more favourable 
tariff treatment to the products of developing countries for ten years. At the end of the 
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1979, developing countries secured 
adoption of the Enabling Clause, a permanent deviation from MFN by joint decision of 
the GATT Contracting Parties. The Enabling Clause was incorporated into the GATT 
1994 upon the entry into force of the Uruguay Round agreements. In 1999, the WTO 
General Council adopted a decision which waived GATT Article I:1 until June 30, 2009.  
As noted in  the introductory material, EU and US trade policies towards 
developing countries go beyond their standard GSP schemes. In the case of the EU one 
of these additional nonreciprocal preference regimes is the ACP-EU Partnership 
Agreement. The notion of “ACP States” goes back to the “ACP Group of States”, 
formally established in 1975. From 1975 until 2000 the ACP-EU relations were 
governed by the regularly adapted and updated Lomé Conventions. The fourth Lomé 
Convention expired on 29 February, 2000, and it was succeeded by the Cotonou 
Agreement.  The ACP Group of States counts 79 countries and most products 
originating in this group of countries are exempted from EU custom duties. Another 
preference regime, that forms part of the EU’s system of preferences, is the so-called 
Everything But Arms initiative, which provide duty-free and quota-free access to the 
EU market for all products (with the exception of arms and ammunition and some 
agricultural  products) for the 49 Least Developed Countries.  In terms of product 
coverage EBA is currently the most inclusive program.  
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The US administration also offers countries in the Caribbean and in Latin 
America special preferences under its Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Andean 
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), respectively. On the one hand, the CBI was initially 
launched in 1983, through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). In 
2000, it was substantially expanded through the US-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership 
Act (CBTPA). Currently, the CBI provides beneficiary countries with duty-free access 
to the US market for most goods. On the other hand, the ATPA was enacted in 
December 1991, to help four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) 
in their fight against drug production and trafficking by expanding their economic 
alternatives. This initiative provides duty-free access to the US market for most of the 
products coming from these four countries, without requiring reciprocal liberalization in 
turn. The ATPA was renewed and amended in 2002 under a new denomination: the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. The main change was the 
extension of the duty-free access to apparel and footwear. 
Finally, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is the most recent 
one-way preferential arrangement of the US administration. Introduced in 2000, as part 
of the US “trade, not aid” economic philosophy towards Africa, AGOA has extended 
the product coverage of the US GSP scheme in the field of textiles and apparel products 
(in which beneficiary countries have the greatest comparative advantage) to around 40 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa.   
  Before presenting the methodology, it is worth noting that there are large 
differences in the relative importance that developed countries markets represent in total 
exports from beneficiary countries. In 2008, both the EU and the US represent a quite 
relevant market share for the developing countries beneficiaries of the corresponding 
nonreciprocal preference regimes. In the cases of the GSP schemes of EU and US as  
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well as in the rest of nonreciprocal regimes granted for these countries (ACP-EU, EBA 
and AGOA) this market share ranges from 21 to 26%. It is even larger for the cases of 
ATPA (33%) and CBI (67%). For the remaining GSP schemes, market shares are lower: 
Japan (7 %), Australia (3%), Canada and Turkey (around 1.5%) and Switzerland, 
Russia, Norway and New Zealand less than 0.5%. 
 
3. Methodology 
The international trade literature provides two kinds of approaches to analysing 
the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). The ex-ante approach, which uses 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, and the  ex post  approach, which 
measures  trade effects by means of  regression  techniques.  One  advantage of CGE 
models is that they can be used to draw direct inferences about consumption, output and 
welfare.  However, one major limitation of these  models  is that  they  use restrictive 
assumptions and very simple characterisations of real-world  preferential trade 
agreements. In contrast, while  the  econometric studies cannot analyse consumption, 
output or welfare effects directly, they have three major advantages: implementation 
simplicity, superior empirical performance and the possibility of examining actual PTAs.  
The gravity equation has emerged as the empirical workhorse in international 
trade for examining the ex-post effects of PTAs on bilateral trade flows. Therefore, to 
estimate the ex post  effects of  the special  trade preferences given by developed 
countries to developing countries on international trade, we rely on the standard gravity 
model of trade, which relates bilateral trade flows to economic size, distance and other 
factors that affect trade barriers.
2
                                                   
2 The initial applications of the gravity equation to international trade lacked theoretical foundation. 
However, since the end of the 1970´s the situation has changed and nowadays the gravity equation is 
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We estimate the following general equation: 
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where i and j denote trading partners, t is time, and the variables are defined as 
follows: 
Xijt are the bilateral export flows from i to j in year t, 
Y denotes Gross Domestic Product,  
D denotes the distance between i and j,  
Cont is a dummy variable equal to one when i and j share a land border,  
Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
Landl is the number of landlocked areas in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2),  
Lang is a dummy variable which is unity if i and j have a common language, 
Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
ComCountry is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were part of a same country in 
the past, 
Creligion is an index of common religion
3
CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
, 
PTAPlur (PTABil)  is a binary variable which is unity if i and  j  belong to the same 
plurilateral (bilateral) preferential trade agreement, 
UPR is a binary variable which is unity if i is a beneficiary of an Unilateral Preference 
Regime and j is the corresponding preference-giving country, and 
uijt is the standard classical error term. 
                                                                                                                                                     
backed up by sound theory. See, among others, Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985 and 1989), Deardoff 
(1998), Evenett and Keller (2002), Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). 
3 The index is defined as: (% Protestants in country i * % Protestants in country j) + (% Catholics in 
country i * % Catholics in country j) + (%Muslims in Country i * % Muslims in country j).  
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We estimate the gravity equation (1) in a number of different ways. We begin 
with conventional ordinary least squares, including a full set of year-specific intercepts 
and using robust standard errors. Next we run the gravity equation using both country 
fixed effects (CFE) and country year fixed effects (CYFE). The strategy of using CFE 
sufficiently addresses multilateral resistance in a cross section but CYFE are required to 
comprehensively control for multilateral resistance in panel datasets (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003 and 2004).  We additionally  employ  an  additional and recently 
developed econometric approach: the two-stage estimation procedure proposed by 
HMR (2008), which allows us to correct for selection bias and to account for exporter 
heterogeneity. This procedure is briefly outlined next.  
The HMR (2008) estimation procedure consists in two-stages. In the first stage 
they estimate a probit equation that specifies the probability that country i exports to j 
conditional on the observable variables. In the second stage, predicted components of 
this equation are used to estimate the gravity equation. This procedure simultaneously 
corrects for two types of potential biases: a Heckman selection bias and a bias from 
potential asymmetries in the trade flows between pairs of countries.  
More formally, in a first stage they estimate a probit equation of the type:  
 
Pr ( 1/ var ) ( , , , , ) ij i j ij ij ij ob T observed iables X Z χλ ε = = Φ       (2) 
 
where Tij is an indicator variable equal to 1 when country i exports to j and zero 
when it does not, Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution,  i χ and j λ are exporter and importer fixed effects, Xij are variables which 
affect both the probability and the volume of trade, and Z ij represents variables that are 
used for the exclusion restriction, that is, those that affect the probability of observing a  
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 Using the probit regression, they construct two variables that are included as 
regressors in the second stage estimation. One is the inverse of Mills ratio and the other 
is an expression that controls for firm size heterogeneity. In particular, the second stage 
consists in the estimation for a given year of the following non-linear equation for all 





ij η is the inverse Mills ratio and 
^ * 1() ij ij z ρ
− = Φ  in which 
^
ij ρ are the 





The trade data for the regressand (export flows from country i to country j) come 
from the “Direction of Trade” (DoT) dataset built up by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The data comprise bilateral merchandise trade between 177 countries and 
territories (see Appendix) for seven  years of  the period  1990-2008  at  three-year 
intervals (1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2008).
6
                                                   
4 In this set-up, parameter identification requires the existence of a variable that affects the probability of 
observing a non-zero flow between two countries but not the volume. Alternatively, a variable which 
affects both decisions in opposite directions would also work. 
 The DoT dataset provides 
FOB exports in US dollars. These series are converted into constant terms using the 
American GDP deflator taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department 
of Commerce). 
5 Since equation (3) is non-linear in δ, following HMR (2008) we estimate it using maximum likelihood.  
6 It is noteworthy that not all the areas considered are countries in the conventional sense of the word. We 
also include some dependencies, territories and overseas departments in the data.  
 
11 
The independent variables come from different sources. GDP data in constant 
US dollars are taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank). For 
location of countries (geographical coordinates), used to calculate Great Circle 
Distances, and the construction of the dummy variables for physically contiguous 
neighbours, island and landlocked status, common language, colonial ties, common 
religion and common country background data are taken from the CIA's World 
Factbook. The indicators of preferential trade agreements have been built using data 
from the World Trade Organization, the Preferential Trade Agreements Database (The 
Faculty of Law at McGill University) and the web site 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/index_en.htm.  The indicators of currency 
unions are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), CIA's World Factbook and Masson 
and Pattillo (2005). The sample includes 192 preferential trade agreements (plurilateral 
and bilateral) and 17 currency unions.
7 Data on the key variables AGOA and EBA 
come from the corresponding web pages
8
 
. The list of beneficiaries of the Cotonou 
Agreement comes from http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-
partnerships. The list of countries beneficiaries of the standard GSP schemes are taken 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008). The list of 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) come from 
the Office of United States Trade Representative. 
5. Empirical results 
                                                   
7 The expression  PTAs in this paper refers also to other agreements involving a higher degree of 
economic integration. In fact, most economic integration agreements considered in the sample are free 
trade agreements.  
8  See,  http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html  for AGOA and 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-
arms, for EBA.   
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Our benchmark specification to estimate the effect of unilateral preference 
regimes on developing countries exports is Ordinary Least Squares (with a full set of 
year-specific intercepts added to correct for common shocks and trends). The results are 
reported in column 1 of Table 1. The gravity equation works well in two senses. First, 
the equation fits the data well explaining around two-thirds of the variation of bilateral 
exports flows. Second, the estimated coefficients are, on the whole, intuitive in sign and 
size and both economically and statistically significant.  The negative effect of a 
common religion is the exception. Economically larger countries trade more and more 
distant countries trade less. Landlocked countries trade less, whereas sharing a common 
border, a common language, a common currency, or sharing membership in a 
plurilateral or bilateral preferential trade agreements increase trade. The existence of 
colonial ties encourages trade, as do being islands or part of the same country in the past. 
With regard to the variable of interest (UPR), we find an estimated coefficient that is 
positive but statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 contains regression results adding country-specific 
fixed effects (CFE) and country year fixed effects (CYFE) to the benchmark equation, 
respectively. The inclusion of CFE (column 2) controls for the multilateral resistance 
terms under the assumption that these terms do not vary over time. In almost all cases, 
the impact goes in the same direction  than in column 1. The  exceptions  are  the 
estimated coefficients of the variables for common religion (that in this case is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level) and currency union (that losses the 
statistical significance). The estimated coefficient of the variable UPR also differs from 
that found without controls for multilateral resistance terms. With the inclusion of CFE 
the estimated coefficient is positive (0.200) and highly statistically significant. Results 
including time-varying fixed effects for exporters and importers (CYFE) reinforces this  
 
13 
finding (column 3). When we properly account for the fact that multilateral resistance 
may change over time,  the variable of interest presents an  estimated coefficient that 
raises its value from 0.200 to 0.347. Thus, we find that unilateral preference regimes are 
associated with an increase of exports from developing countries benefiting from these 
nonreciprocal preference schemes. 
Columns 1 to 3 report the results for three specifications that include a catch-all 
UPR  dummy. Eicher and Henn (2009), in a recent paper on a related strand of the 
empirical gravity literature (the measurement of the effect of currency unions on trade), 
show the importance of splitting the catch-all PTA and CU dummies into the 
individuals PTAs and CU arrangements. According to these authors, if individual PTAs 
and CUs do not generate identical trade benefits, as a large empirical literature has 
documented, estimating an average coefficient using catch-all PTA or CU dummies 
generates biased  results.  In line with this argument,  it is important to estimate the 
gravity equation allowing for individual UPR effects.
9
The next step of the estimation process is to run the gravity equation splitting the 
UPR dummy into a catch-all GSP dummy and separate dummies for AGOA, CBI, ATPA, 
EBA and ACP-EU. Columns 4 to 6 present the results using OLS, CFE and CYFE, 
respectively. We focus in the latter approach since it comprehensively accounts for 
multilateral resistance and, therefore, it is the only fully in line with the theoretical 
foundations of the gravity equation.  We find that CBI,  ATPA,  ACP-EU  and  EBA 
increase exports from the developing world, as do GSP schemes. The results for GSP 
are consistent with Subramanian and Wei (2007), who find that the GSP extended from 
  
                                                   
9 Since AGOA members are also GSP beneficiaries of US, before AGOA got into force the dummy 
variable GSPUS takes the value of 1 for all countries under the US's GSP scheme and after that date only 
for non-AGOA countries under the US's GSP scheme. The same criteria are followed for the GSPEU 
dummy with respect to the dummies ACP-EU and EBA.  
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the North to developing countries boosts trade.
10 However, we do not find evidence that 
membership in the AGOA has had a positive effect on African exports to US.
11
Table 2 repeats the estimations with higher levels of disaggregation  of the 
variables of interest. The first three columns present the results when we split the GSP 
dummy into three dummies: GSPEU (for the EU), GSPUS (for the US) and one separate 
dummy variable to capture all “other” GSP schemes (OtherGSP).  The  estimated 
coefficients for GSP schemes of EU and US  are  both  positive and statistically 
significant, once we control for time-varying multilateral resistance terms. In particular, 
the estimated coefficients for GSPUS and GSPEU are 0.830 and 0.552, respectively 
(and they are statistically significant at the 1 percent level). However,  the estimated 
coefficient of the variable that captures the impact of all other GSP schemes altogether 
is lower (0.085) and non-statistically significant at conventional levels. According to 
these results, the positive effect of being in the standard EU’s GSP scheme is larger than 
that of being in ACP-EU agreement and that of being in EBA.
 
12
                                                   
10 There are few studies that have attempted to estimate the overall effect of the GSP. Rose (2004) and 
Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007) find a positive effect but treat the average of two-way bilateral trade 
as the dependent variable. Subramanian and Wei (2007) criticize Rose for averaging imports and exports, 
though GSP effects should differ according to whether the importer or the exporter was the recipient of 
the preferences. These authors, using unidirectional trade data, show an estimated effect for the GSP very 
similar to that reported by Rose (2004). In contrast, Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007), using also a data 
set comprised of directed dyads, find a negative coefficient for GSP. 
 However, in contrast 
11 Some papers provide arguments  for  the ineffectiveness of AGOA. For instance, Matoo, Roy and 
Subramanian (2002) outline the relevance of rules of origin as a factor that could limit the achievement of 
high benefits. Nouve (2005) asserts that, while the AGOA apparel preferences may increase African 
textile and apparel exports to US, resource allocation probably would induce the reduction of overall 
exports.  Finally,  Brenton and Hoppe (2006) argue that the impact of AGOA would be enhanced if 
preferences were extended to all products. Additionally, these authors point out that for the majority of 
beneficiaries the value of preferences is very small.  
12 Nilsson (2002), in a comparative analysis of the effects of the EU’s Lomé Convention and GSP on 
exports of developing countries, finds positive and statistically significant export effects of both, but 
concludes that the export impact of the Lomé Convention were greater over the period 1973-1992.  
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with the estimates for the impact of the US’s GSP scheme, as well as the CBI and 
ATPA initiatives, but in line with our previous estimates, countries belonging to AGOA 
do not export more to the US. 
Next, we re-estimate the gravity equation including a separate dummy for each 
individual UPR (columns 4 to 6). It allows us to check that there is a large heterogeneity 
in the impact of the different GSP schemes. According to the results reported in column 
6 (CYFE), the largest estimated coefficients are found for GSPUS (0.831) and 
GSPJapan  (0.791), followed by GSPEU  (0.559).  However, our results suggest that 
remaining  GSP schemes are not associated with an increase in exports. In fact, 
surprisingly, the dummy variables for Australia,  New Zealand’s  and Russia’s GSP 
schemes show a negative and statistically significant coefficient.  
Column 6 of Table 2 reports the results for a specification that include catch-all 
PTA or CU dummies. Following Eicher and Henn (2009), we also report the results 
allowing for individual plurilateral PTAs and individual CUs effects (column 7). The 
estimated coefficients of these variables and the fixed effects are not reported in the 
table for ease of presentation.
13
The problem of all the above estimations is that in those regressions we use the 
sample of countries with positive trade volumes between them. Disregarding countries 
that do not trade with each other may produce biased estimates (HMR, 2008). Therefore, 
 As we can observe, the estimated coefficients do not 
change in a significant way and, in particular, the estimated coefficients of the variables 
of interest remain  nearly unaltered with two exceptions: GSPNorway  and 
GSPSwitzerland (that are positive and now reach the statistical significance at least at 
the 10 percent level). 
                                                   
13 Our sample includes more than 200 individual bilateral and plurilateral PTAs and CUs. For bilateral 
PTAs we have estimated an average coefficient using a catch-all dummy. The inclusion of individual 
dummies for bilateral PTAs does not affect the results in any significant way.  
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now we turn to the analysis of the results using the two stages estimation procedure 
suggested by HMR (2008). Table 3 reports the results. Since our sample has time 
dimension we include in this framework country year fixed effects in order to capture 
the time-varying nature of trade costs in panel data.
14 The results for the probit 
regression are presented in column 1.
15 Before discussing the empirical results, it is 
worth noting that the estimation of equation (2) might be subject to the incidental 
parameter problem, introducing a bias in the coefficients of the rest of variables (Xij and 
Zij). However, as pointed out by Fernández-Val (2007), this bias does not affect the 
estimated marginal effects and, therefore, the predicted values obtained for the 
dependent variable. These results compared with those found using CYFE in Table 2 
clearly show that almost the same control variables that impact export volumes in the 
traditional estimation with CYFE also impact the probability that country i exports to 
country  j.  The exception  is  the dummy  variable  CU,  which  positively  affects  the 
probability of exports but do not affect the volume of exports (in any of the previous 
specifications).
16
                                                   
14 HMR (2008) applies their two stages estimation procedure to data from 1986 including in the 
regression exporting and importing CFE. The working paper version of this article (HMR, 2007) also 
presented the results for a large sample that covered all the 1980s. However, they also used in these 
regressions CFE and year fixed effects instead of CYFE. 
 With regard to the dummies for nonreciprocal preference regimes, the 
estimated marginal effect of the variables of interest are once again positive and 
statistically significant for EBA,  ACP-EU  and GSP schemes of EU and US, but in 
contrast to CYFE, this is also the case for GSP schemes of Canada, Japan, Norway, 
15 Following HMR (2008) we also have country pairs whose characteristics are such that their probability 
of trade is indistinguishable from 1. Therefore, we assign the same 
*
ij z   to those country pairs with an 
estimated 
^
ij ρ   > 0.9999999. 
16 The result for the variable CU (currency unions) contrast with the large evidence emerged after the 
Rose (2000) seminal paper. See Gil, Llorca and Martínez-Serrano (2008c) for a review of the literature 
about the CU trade effects.   
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Russia and Switzerland, suggesting that being members of these initiatives raises the 
probability of bilateral trade from developing countries to the cited developed countries.  
Using the probit regression, as explained before, we construct two variables for 
correcting sample selection bias and firm heterogeneity. Both the non-linear coefficient 
δ and the linear coefficient for 
^*
ij η  are precisely estimated. The results for the second 
stage can be seen in column 2 of Table 3. The variable CU has been excluded from the 
estimation for identification reasons.
17
Finally, it is important to analyze whether or not unilateral preference regimes 
have also had an  effect on exports from the preference-granting countries to the 
beneficiary countries.  In order to study the potential effect of unilateral preference 
regimes on exports from developed countries to developing countries,  we  have 
augmented the gravity equation (1) by adding a binary dummy variable (MUPR) which 
is unity if i  is a benefactor country of an unilateral preference regime and j  is the 
corresponding beneficiary country. The results from  a theoretically motivated 
 The estimated coefficients are in line with those 
found using OLS including CYFE. At this stage, we once again find a positive and 
significant coefficient for EBA, ACP-EU, GSPUS and GSPEU. This is also the case for 
GSPCanada,  GSPJapan,  GSPNorway,  GSPSwitzerland  and  GSPTurkey,  but  not for 
AGOA, CBI, ATPA and the remaining GSP schemes. In particular, the largest estimated 
coefficients are found for GSPJapan (0.811) and GSPUS (0.766), which suggests that, 
other things equal, developing countries benefiting from trade preferences under the 
Japan and United States GSP schemes export more than twice to these markets. Once 
again, the estimated coefficients for GSPAustralia, GSPNZ and GSPRussia are negative 
and statistically significant. 
                                                   
17 Following HMR (2007, footnote 26), we have also used the variable common religion for this purpose. 
It yields very similar results (available from the authors upon request).  
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specification of the gravity equation (using CYFE) appear in column 1 of Table 4. The 
estimated coefficients change very little with respect to those reported in column 3 of 
Table 1. In particular, the evidence about the positive impact of unilateral preference 
regimes  on exports from developing countries to  industrialized nations remains 
unaltered and the estimated coefficient of this variable is very similar to that offered in 
Table 1. The novelty is that we also find a positive (0.451) and statistically significant 
coefficient (at the 1 percent level) for the variable that captures the effect on exports 
from  developed countries  to developing countries (MUPR).  It suggests that  these 
preferential regimes have had economic success in terms of trade in both directions. 
Columns 2 to 3 of Table 4 present the results for different levels of 
disaggregation of the UPRs dummies (using again CYFE in all the cases). Similar to the 
column 1 results, the coefficient estimates of the variables of interest in columns 2 to 4 
of Table 4 lead to conclude that there is evidence of a positive effect on benefactor 
exports  to developing countries.  In  most of the cases the unilateral programs have 
stimulated trade in both directions. However, and in line with our previous estimates, 
AGOA is an exception. It has not increased exports in any direction.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether and to what extent unidirectional trade 
agreements have increased developing countries’ exports to richer countries. Moreover, 
it also analyses the potential impact in the reverse direction. Using traditional estimation 
techniques and recent developments in the econometric analysis of the gravity equation 
over the period 1990-2008, we find robust evidence that, on the whole, nonreciprocal 
preference regimes and GSP schemes have had an economically significant effect on 
exports. However, the estimation of catch-all dummies masks heterogeneous results for 
the individual schemes. In particular, we find strong evidence that the ACP-EU and  
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GSP schemes of US and EU have had a large positive effect on developing countries 
exports to the corresponding developed markets (US or EU). This result also applies to 
EBA membership and to the GSP schemes of Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and 
Turkey once we control for time-varying multilateral resistance terms, sample selection 
bias and unobservable firm heterogeneity. However, we do not find evidence that 
membership in the AGOA scheme has had a positive effect on exports from African 
countries to US and the same applies for the remaining GSP schemes.  
Most economists prefer two-way tariff cuts because when tariffs are reduced in a 
reciprocal manner rather than in an unilateral way, countries tend to produce and export 
on the basis of their comparative advantage (thus exporting products that they produce 
relatively better and importing products that others do relatively more efficiently). 
Despite the “lack of reciprocity”, we find that unilateral preference regimes have also 
had a positive effect on exports from donor countries to developing counterparts. It 
suggests that, in contrast with the argument raised by critics of nonreciprocal programs, 
unilateral  preference regimes have not had a perverse effect on trade policies of 
beneficiary countries (in particular with respect to the preference-granting countries). 
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Table 1. OLS and fixed effects estimations of the gravity equation (1). Sample period 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 
2005, 2008. 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS  CFE  CYFE  OLS  CFE  CYFE 




































































































































































































































     



















































Time dummies  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
No observat.  97,730  97,730  106,870  97,730  97,730  106,870 
Adj-R
2  0.66  0.74  0.67  0.66  0.74  0.67 
Notes: Regressand: log of real bilateral exports. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) are in 






Table 2. OLS and fixed effects estimations of the gravity equation (1). Sample period 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008. 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  OLS  CFE  CYFE  OLS  CFE  CYFE  CYFE 












   












   















































































































































































































































































































































































       

















































































Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
No observat.  97,730  97,730  106,870  97,730  97,730  106,870  106,870 
Adj-R
2  0.66  0.74  0.67  0.66  0.74  0.67  0.67 
Notes: Regressand: log of real bilateral exports. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) are in parentheses.* significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The regression reported in column 7 includes individual dummies for all 




Table 3. HMR two-stage estimation with CYFE. Sample period 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008.  
Variables  HMR two-stage estimation  
with CYFE 
  (1)  (2) 
  Probit coefficient  Marginal effects  ML 








































































































CBI      -0.178 
(0.339) 
ATPA      0.276 
(0.273) 






































































































ETA   
 
  1.312 
(0.045)
*** 
DELTA      0.147 
(0.031)
*** 




2   
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) are in parentheses.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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Table 4. Country year fixed effects estimations of the gravity equation. Effect on benefactor countries exports. Sample period 1990, 
1993, 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008. 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln Dij  -1.235 (0.020)
***  -1.219 (0.020)
***  -1.225 (0.020)
***  -1.234 (0.020)
*** 
Contij  0.624 (0.075)
***  0.658 (0.076)
***  0.639 (0.076)
***  0.606 (0.076)
*** 
Lang ij  0.365 (0.036)
***  0.361 (0.037)
***  0.356 (0.037)
***  0.352 (0.037)
*** 
Colonyij   1.268 (0.084)
***  1.315 (0.085)
***  1.288 (0.086)
***  1.290 (0.086)
*** 
ComCountij   2.636 (0.116)
***  2.709 (0.115)
***  2.701 (0.115)
***  2.605 (0.117)
*** 
Islandij  0.452 (0.071)
***  0.441 (0.071)
***  0.443 (0.071)
***  0.446 (0.071)
*** 
Landlij  -0.834 (0.052)
***  -0.837 (0.052)
***  -0.824 (0.052)
***  -0.841 (0.052)
*** 
CReligionij  0.385 (0.048)
***  0.404 (0.048)
***  0.410 (0.048)
***  0.420 (0.048)
*** 
CUijt  -0.080 (0.110)  -0.176 (0.110)  -0.128 (0.110)  -0.120 (0.110) 
RTAPlurijt  0.916 (0.052)
***  0.876 (0.052)
***  0.905 (0.052)
***  0.901 (0.053)
*** 
RTABilijt  0.385 (0.045)
***  0.395 (0.046)
***  0.324 (0.046)
***  0.315 (0.046)
*** 
UPRijt  0.301 (0.049)
***       
GSPij    0.339 (0.054)
***     
OtherGSPij      0.040 (0.086)   
AGOAijt    -0.274 (0.335)  -0.097 (0.367)  -0.098 (0.367) 
CBIij    0.632 (0.323)
**  0.549 (0.344)  0.552 (0.343) 
ATPAij    1.127 (0.238)
***  0.869 (0.284)
***  0.867 (0.285)
*** 
EBAijt    0.149 (0.094)  0.225 (0.094)
**  0.214 (0.094)
** 
ACP-EUij    0.145 (0.074)
**  0.216 (0.075)
***  0.217 (0.075)
*** 
GSPEUij      0.708 (0.050)
***  0.474 (0.063)
*** 
GSPUSij      0.848 (0.155)
***  0.787 (0.232)
*** 
GSPAustraliaij        -0.690 (0.289)
** 
GSPCanadaij        0.205 (0.202) 
GSPJapanij        0.746 (0.244)
*** 
GSPNZij        -0.607 (0.238)
** 
GSPNorwayij        0.282 (0.237) 
GSPRussiaij        -0.774 (0.278)
*** 
GSPSwitzerlandij        0.221 (0.188) 
GSPTurkeyij        0.117 (0.211) 
MUPRijt  0.451 (0.044)
***       
MGSPij    0.475 (0.045)
***     
MOtherGSPij      0.127 (0.074)
*   
MAGOAijt    -0.239 (0.138)
*  -0.097 (0.164)  -0.095 (0.165) 
MCBIij    0.771 (0.175)
***  0.723 (0.200)
***  0.720 (0.199)
*** 
MATPAij    0.662 (0.146)
***  0.464 (0.169)
***  0.453 (0.169)
*** 
MEBAijt    0.154 (0.066)
**  0.035 (0.067)
  -0.038 (0.067) 
MACP-EUij    0.021 (0.055)  0.125 (0.056)
**  0.130 (0.056)
** 
MGSPEUij      0.708 (0.049)
***  0.703 (0.050)
*** 
MGSPUSij      0.848 (0.155)
***  0.848 (0.156)
*** 
MGSPAustraliaij        -0.215 (0.256) 
MGSPCanadaij        0.434 (0.159)
*** 
MGSPJapanij        0.153 (0.235)
*** 
MGSPNZij        -0.036 (0.191) 
MGSPNorwayij        0.106 (0.152) 
MGSPRussiaij        -0.350 (0.278) 
MGSPSwitzerlandij        0.559 (0.186)
*** 
MGSPTurkeyij        -0.370 (0.151)
** 
No observat.  106,870  106,870  106,870  106,870 
Adj-R
2  0.67  0.67  0.67  0.68 
Notes: Regressand: log of real bilateral exports. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) are in parentheses.* significant 






Table A1: Sample of countries. 
 
Albania   Dominican Republic  Liberia  Seychelles  
Algeria   Ecuador   Libya   Sierra Leone 
Angola   Egypt   Lithuania   Singapore 
Antigua and Barbuda  El Salvador   Macedonia   Slovak Republic 
Argentina  Equatorial Guinea  Madagascar   Slovenia 
Armenia   Estonia   Malawi  Solomon Islands 
Australia   Ethiopia   Malaysia   Somalia 
Austria   Fiji   Maldives   South Africa 
Azerbaijan   Finland   Mali  Spain 
Bahamas   France   Malta   Sri Lanka  
Bahrain   French Polynesia   Mauritania  St. Kitts and Nevis 
Bangladesh   Gabon  Mauritius   Sta. Lucia 
Barbados   Gambia   Mexico   St. Tome and Principe 
Belarus  Georgia  Moldova   St. Vincent and Gr.  
Belgium-Luxembourg  Germany  Mongolia   Sudan 
Benin   Ghana   Morocco   Suriname 
Bermudas  Greece   Mozambique   Swaziland 
Bolivia   Grenada   Myanmar   Sweden  
Bosnia and Herzegovina   Guatemala  Nepal   Switzerland  
Brazil   Guinea   Netherlands   Syria  
Bulgaria   Guinea Bissau  Netherlands Antilles  Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso   Guyana   New Caledonia  Tanzania 
Burundi  Haiti   New Zealand  Thailand  
Cambodia   Honduras   Nicaragua   Togo  
Cameroon   Hungary   Niger   Tonga  
Canada   Iceland  Nigeria   Trinidad and Tobago 
Cape Verde   India   Norway   Tunisia  
Central African Republic  Indonesia   Oman   Turkey  
Chad   Iran  Pakistan   Turkmenistan 
Chile   Iraq  Panama   Uganda 
China - Mainland  Ireland   Papua New Guinea   Ukraine  
China – Hong Kong  Israel   Paraguay  United Arab Emirates  
China – Macao  Italy   Peru   United Kingdom  
Colombia   Jamaica   Philippines   United States of America  
Comoros   Japan   Poland   Uruguay  
Congo, D.R.  Jordan   Portugal   Uzbekistan 
Congo, Republic of  Kazakhstan   Qatar  Vanuatu  
Costa Rica   Kenya   Reunion  Venezuela  
Croatia   Kiribati   Romania   Vietnam  
Cyprus   Korea  Russia   Yemen  
Czech Republic  Kuwait   Rwanda   Zambia  
Côte d’Ivoire  Kyrgyz Republic   Samoa  Zimbabwe 
Denmark   Laos   Saudi Arabia   
Djibouti  Latvia   Senegal    
Dominica   Lebanon  Serbia and Montenegro   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 